This study analyzes the monetary policy transmission in India with the help of bank lending channel hypothesis. We test the shift in loan supply emanating from the changes in the prime policy rate used by the Reserve Bank of India. Using yearly bank balance sheet data from 1996 to 2007, the paper provides evidence of an operational BLC in India. Further, segregating banks by asset size and liquidity, we find that small, illiquid banks are more affected by policy changes, and the effect is more pronounced in areas of non-priority sector lending. Finally, the domestically owned banks are more sensitive to policy rate changes vis-à-vis foreign banks.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of monetary policy transmission has remained by and large elusive. Although most economists tend to agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can significantly influence the course of the real economy; the exact process of this transmission mechanism still remains a "black box" (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) .
Recent research has shown that accurately defining the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy holds the key in explaining the effects of policy on the economy.
Specifically, in the credit channel, banks are assumed to play a pivotal role in the transmission of policy. Assuming asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, proponents of the credit channel offers an intuitive explanation for the strength, timing, and distributional effects of policy on the economy.
A large body of literature over the last decade has examined the existence of the credit channel by further dividing it into two sub-channels that account for the role of banks in transmitting central bank impulses: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel (BLC). This paper provides evidence in support of the credit channel, in general, and the bank lending channel, in particular, from the perspective of an emerging economy, India.
The bank lending channel of monetary transmission hypothesize that during a contractionary policy pursued by the central bank, there would be a substantial decline in the reservable deposit in the banking system due to higher reserved requirements on banks and the increased alternative cost of holding money. Therefore, if banks cannot replace the fall in loanable funds through liquidating assets or through external forms of finance, the contractionary policy will decrease their loan supply and, in turn the real spending of their borrowers. The existence of the bank lending channel hypothesis critically hinges on two necessary assumptions: (a) some spending are dependent on bank lending and (b) monetary policy can affect supply of bank loans and the resulting decrease in loan supply reduces real aggregate spending (Kashyap & Stein 1995) .
Typically, as the first assumption is likely to be empirically valid, most of the studies therefore focus on testing the latter assumption by examining whether monetary policy shift the supply of bank loan and these impacts are if at all uniformly spread across all types of banks.
The testing of bank lending channel hypothesis has gained importance of late, due to the significant structural change witnessed by the Indian banking sector in both its working as well as its regulation. Prior to mid-eighties, India's banking sector has been perceived to be excessively regulated and financially repressed. Though intervention in India has for long been justified on grounds of achieving the government's development goals and achieving equitable growth, the long-drawn-out existence of excessively large public banks led to inefficient allocation of resources as well as concentration of power within a few banks. Over 90% of the assets and credit during 1991 lay within the control of 27 public-sector banks.
However, following the Chakravarthy Committee (1985) recommendations, the coupon rates on government bonds were gradually increased to reflect market conditions. More comprehensive reforms followed the Narasimham Committee report of 1991. The year 1991 saw India going through a balance of payment crisis following which, comprehensive reforms were initiated. The Narasimham Committee's recommendations brought in prudential regulations and norms, a reduction in the CRR and SLR requirements, as well as interest rate and entry deregulation. In the following year, the Basel Accord capital adequacy standards were adopted. Therefore, in the liberalized regime the role of the RBI and its working through the monetary policy has gained increasing importance in India.
In this paper, we hypothesize that a contractionary policy pursued by RBI, through the prime policy rate (bank rate and repo rate) will reduce the loanable funds of banks and if banks cannot replace this fall without any cost by liquidating their assets or through external forms of finance, it would lead to a decrease in loan supply.
The empirical test for the existence of the BLC have been carried out for many economies, on a varying scale, both with respect to the methodology used as well as the reasons and implications cited. While the earlier empirical studies mainly used time series techniques to study the bank loan models, the more recent researches tend to focus on individual bank behavior using panel data models.
Using aggregate level bank data for the US banking sector from 1959-1978, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) concluded that the interest rate on Federal funds was a good indicator of future movement in real macroeconomic activity, and also of the monetary policy actions. Monetary policy was understood to work partly through credit and partly through deposits. Bernanke followed up this work with a paper with Gertler (1993) , that tried to establish how exactly monetary policy exerts its influence on real output and spending. The paper looked into the credit channel as an interim between monetary policy actions and changes in the real economy, changes that are traditionally seen with a lagged response. In conclusion, the paper proposed that the lag was due to the BLC taking effect.
However, a primary drawback of these aggregate level studies lies in their inability to distinguish between lending responses resulting due to changes in loan demand or from the BLC through changes in the loan supply (Westerlund, 2003) .
Recent studies have hence increasingly used panel data models to study the BLC at the micro level. Panel data models tend to provide more accurate and precise estimates due to the extra time series observations they employ.
Developing on this, various bank level studies followed. The studies primarily attempted to distinguish banks based on asset size, capitalization, and liquidity. These studies attempted to show that bank lending was affected by monetary policy changes and that small, undercapitalized, and illiquid banks were most responsive and affected to that end. Most papers have supported the existence of a BLC, though the degree to which they agree upon its effectiveness varies. Kashyap et al (1993 Kashyap et al ( , 1995 Kashyap et al ( , and 2000 for the US banking sector. They brought in an important element of globalization and studied its effect on US banking as well as the effect US monetary policy could have on other nations. Large globally oriented banks were shown to rely extensively on internal capital markets to smoothen domestic liquidity shocks. Even though they agreed upon its existence, they did conclude on the weakening of the BLC in US.
We attempt to add to this vast literature on the Bank Lending Channel of monetary policy transmission, using a panel of yearly disaggregated data on individual banks covering the period 1996-2007, for an emerging economy, India. We model the lending responses using dynamic panel data model. The paper aims to contribute in three primary ways: First, the paper can be viewed as the first work on studying the BLC in India 2 . Since India is one of the largest emerging economies with strong banking sector, a study of its banking behaviour and the effectiveness of its monetary policy provide the critical insight into the BLC hypothesis. Second, despite the comprehensive reforms, banking service in India remains highly regulated. Lending has always been viewed with particular interest and priority sector lending still remains legislated. We attempt to distinguish between priority and non-priority lending effects, simply because given its nature, inclusion of priority lending will only dilute the BLC. Finally, another distinguishing feature of this study is the methodology used. The paper recognizes the pro-cyclical lending behaviour and employs a dynamic panel data model to account for the lag effect in the lending behaviour.
The main findings reveal that monetary policy changes have a direct impact on bank lending and that these responses are more pronounced in the case of small banks. We also show that non-priority sector better supports the existence of a BLC, and that domestically-owned banks are more responsive to monetary policy changes.
Specifically, the paper establishes the BLC in India; examines the dynamics between domestic and foreign banks as well as the dynamics between small and large banks and also differentiates the priority sector lending and non-priority sector lending.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present the methodology and the estimation procedure used in the paper. Section 3 presents a brief description of the data. Section 4 contains the empirical findings of our model. Section 5, presents the conclusion.
Methodology
In this section we outline the hypothesis that we are trying to test through an empirical model and explain the methodology used. The general model used for our estimation is: size. Liquidity is constructed as the ratio of bank liquid assets to total assets. Further, the variable is centered on its overall sample average after taking its logarithmic transformation. This makes the variable for balance sheet strength sum to zero across all banks. Asset size is constructed in a manner similar to liquidity by taking the total assets of the respective banks. Thus, the effect of PR*BS_Strength can be interpreted distinctly as an effect of policy change depending on the balance sheet strength of the bank. In most of our models, we have used liquidity, due to its statistical significance.
To account for movements in loan demand, most models are usually augmented with macroeconomic variables like GDP and other macro indices. However, because macroeconomic aggregates of this sort do not capture cross-sectional differences in lending opportunities, we instead include the growth of certificates of deposit (CD) and growth in securities (SEC). CD is the first difference of the logarithm of certificates of deposit and hence represents a measure of growth. SEC has been constructed on similar lines. The variable DUM is included to account for the incorporation of certain dummy variables in sub-sample models to obtain segment specific effects.
To test for an operational BLC we require the following conditions to be satisfied: (i) the estimated coefficient of PR should be less than zero (β < 0). This would imply that shifting to a tighter monetary policy regime reduces the growth rate of loan supply in the economy; (ii) the estimated coefficient on the interaction variable PR*BS_Strength should be positive (δ > 0) indicating that the effect of a policy change is more pronounced for the weaker banks (i.e. banks having liquidity or asset size lesser than the mean sample liquidity or asset size), than on the stronger banks. Therefore, fulfillment of these two conditions is sufficient to prove the existence of BLC in India.
Most studies use a static model to study the dynamics of bank lending ignoring the pro-cyclic lending behavior. To this end Ln(-i) in equation 1 corrects the lag effect in the growth of loan supply.
Due to the presence of many panels and relatively few periods, we use the Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond system estimation for dynamic linear panel models.
However, by construction, in this dynamic panel-data model in equation 1, the lagged dependent variables are correlated with the unobserved cross-sectional effects, making estimators inconsistent. Arellano-Bond (1991) developed a GMM method to estimate these models by using instruments to form the moment conditions. Moreover, ArellanoBond estimators become weak if the AR process is too persistent or ratio of the variance of the idiosyncratic error becomes too large. Therefore given the nature of our panel, we use Blundell and Bond (1998) system estimation for dynamic linear panel models.
Blundell and Bond (1998) developed on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995) , and proposed a system estimator. Finally, the validity of the empirical model used in the paper is established using the Sargan test. Under the test, the rejection of the null hypothesis justifies the validity of the instruments and the strength of the model.
DATA ANALYSIS
The individual bank balance sheet data used in this paper has been Lending by banks initially captures all the loans disbursed by the respective banks in the particular financial year; however for further analysis we also distinguish priority sector lending from non-priority sector lending. Banks' liquid asset is defined as sum of cash in hand and balances with RBI and money at call and short notice. Asset size is the total assets as captured by the individual bank's balance sheet.
Due to the policy regime shift adopted by the RBI in 2002, the Repo rate has been used as the effective policy rate for the period 2002-2007, while the bank rate has been used for the earlier period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . Bank Rate can be defined as the interest rate charged by the RBI on loans to commercial banks. It is mainly used by the RBI to influence the rates that commercial banks offer on loans to businesses and consumers. In India, the Bank Rate had been used as the prime policy rate till 2002, and now the Repo Rate is used as the prime policy rate 3 . The Repo Rate refers to the rate at which the banks can borrow from the RBI against approved securities. Figure 3 .2 gives a brief idea about the 3 The bank rate has been fixed at 6% relationship seen between prime policy rates and the total loan supply by the banks in the sample. Fig 3. 2a demonstrates this for the bank rate regime, and Fig 3. 2b does the same for the Repo Rate regime. We observe a very well pronounced inverse relation between the bank rate and loan supply. However, this inverse relation seems to have weakened after the adoption of the repo rate as the prime policy rate. Figure 3 .1 demonstrates the highly skewed nature of our data. Even though the banking sector has undergone comprehensive reforms, and seen a wave of deregulation, over 80% of the loan supply in the economy has been offered by big banks (Fig 3.1a) , i.e., banks with an asset base greater than the sample average asset base in that particular year. Sample statistics also point to the fact that the bottom half of the banking sector controlled just over 5% of the credit in India during 2007. Drawing from the profile of the top 10 banks, it is not likely that this 5% figure has changed much during our sample period.
The next section analyzes the BLC in detail. These preliminary observations provide further insight into the empirical analysis presented in the next section.
Empirical Results
In this section we present the empirical findings of our BLC hypothesis.
We begin by examining the effect of monetary action on total loan disbursements by banks, followed by a close examination of the lending behvoiur for the priority versus non-priority sectors. We then explore the differential impact of the BLC on public and private sector banks, and also on small and large banks. Finally, we study the dynamics between domestic and foreign banks.
Ideally, when the central bank in any country adopts a contractionary policy stand, the economy experiences a fall in money balances primarily through fall in lending by the financial institutions or banks in the country. Expectedly enough, big banks due to their reserves of other assets/ securities and power to issue greater amounts of CD's are able to preempt this liquidity shock as compared to small banks. Growth in CD has a positive and significant impact on growth of loan supply. Given the construction of the respective variables, it implies that a 1% growth in CDs results in a 0.15% growth in loan supply. CD enters the model to account for cross-sectional differences in funding opportunities that vary across individual banks, and provides for a good substitute for other macroeconomic variables that may be included to control for loan demand effects.
Therefore, table 4.1 evidently shows the existence of a BLC in the total loan supply behavior. Post estimation Sargan tests reveal that the model is correctly specified. Further, in India, the government and RBI have tried to use the banking sector to its advantage in terms of achieving equitable growth and serving credit to the under-privileged sections of the economy. All banks, domestic and foreign, are required to provide a fixed percentage of their total loan disbursements to the 'priority-sector' in India. Priority sector can thus be claimed to be legislatively governed, and banks have little choice with respect to this. Therefore, we attempt to break-up bank lending into two parts, priority sector lending, and non-priority sector lending. Further, given the nature in which the priority sector lending is governed in India, we expect a weak BLC for priority sector lending. Table 4 .2 and equations 4.2 (priority sector) and 4.3 (non-priority sector) show the estimates obtained for disaggregated (priority and non priority) lending. We see a stronger BLC operating in non-priority sector lending. Both, the direct effect of change in monetary policy on the loan supply, as well as the effect of monetary policy depending on the balance sheet strength of the banks is greater in non-priority sector lending. Weak banks tend to decrease lending to non-priority sectors at a faster rate than to priority sectors in a policy tightening regime. On the other hand, strong banks increase lending to nonpriority sectors at a faster rate than to priority sectors in a less stringent policy regime. It is important to note the difference between equation 4.1 and 4.3. In comparison to equation 4.1 we see that there is a stronger BLC in operation when we consider only non-priority sector lending than when we consider total lending. This happens particularly in the Indian case since priority sector lending tends to dilute the BLC.
Given our findings in the above case, we consider only the non-priority sector lending for all our further analysis. This can be attributed to the fact that most large banks are public sector banks. Finally to avoid the arbitrariness involved in our sub sample analysis, an endogenous liquidity threshold analysis is carried out on an extended sample. In the threshold model, as developed by Hansen (2000) , we specify a regression equation and a threshold variable. Depending upon the regression, the program finds a threshold value for the specified threshold variable. This value attempts to optimally divide the sample into two distinct groups experiencing markedly different impacts on the dependent variable in the specified model as well as a point where there is a break in the threshold variable. Here, we attempt to divide the sample into two multiple groups based on the liquidity of the banks. In this model, the panels are pooled into one crosssectional analysis augmented with additional observations, by extending the sample to 1991. 
Threshold
The estimates from a threshold model are presented in table 4.6. The threshold variable used is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the banks liquid assets to total assets. The threshold value obtained is 0.349092 which divides the sample into two groups with 6% of the observations falling into the higher liquidity category. Thus, table4.6 establishes that banks within the lesser liquidity group are more affected by policy rate changes, although the lagged effect of policy on both the groups is similar. Further, within the group comprising of less liquid banks, the relatively stronger banks are less prone to the BLC effect as indicated by the positive and significant co-efficient on the interaction variable (PR*Liq) in table 4.6.
Conclusions
The study establishes the existence of an operational Bank Lending Channel for monetary transmission in India. Specifically, the result shows that monetary policy changes have a direct impact on bank lending and these responses are more pronounced in case of small banks. The paper also reveals that the non-priority sector better supports the existence of a BLC, and that domestically owned banks are more responsive to monetary policy changes. Our results have certain important implications for the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy: First, the results clearly point to the fact that monetary actions have little effect on large banks, and since these large banks control a major portion of the lending in India, policy effectiveness and transmission could be moderate 4 . Measures to check inflation and the supply of output through police rates changes may not be highly effective.
Second, since large banks are able to insulate themselves from monetary and liquidity shocks, formation of even larger banks through M&A activity should be advocated with cautions. As banks grow bigger, the autonomy they enjoy is huge, and the control of the Central Bank over their lending policy weans. Of the 14 mergers in our sample, 8 took place within the top 10 banks. Formation of overtly larger banks, through the merger of large banks, will only hinder effective policy action.
